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CHAPTER 9
Conventional Weapons and
Weapons Systems
9.1 INTRODUCTION

T

his chapter addresses the legal considerations pertaining to the use of
1
conventional weapons and weapons systems. It is a fundamental tenet of
the law of anned conflict that the right of nations engaged in anned conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. 2 This rule of law is
expressed in the concept that the employment of weapons, material, and
1. DOD Instruction 5500.15, Subj: Review ofLega1ity of Weapons Under International
Law, and DOD Directive 5000.1, Subj: Defense Acquisition, mandate that all weapons newly
developed or purchased by the U.s. armed forces be reviewed for consistency with international
law. These reviews are carried out by the Judge Advocate General of the Service concerned before
the engineering development stage of the acquisition process, and before the initial contpct for
production is let. A similar rule of international law is. imposed, for the first time, on the nations
party to GP I by art. 36. See Robertson, Modem Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict, 362
at 367-68, in Robertson. See also Green 273-74. For further information see DOD Regulation
5000.2-R, Subj: Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major
Automated Information Systems, and SECNAVINST 5000.2B, Subj: Implementation of
Mandatory Procedures for Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and
Non-Major Information Technology Acquisition Programs. See also Meyrowitz, The Function of
the Laws ofWar in Peacetime, 1986 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 71, 78-81; and paragraph 5.4.2, note 34
(p. 303), regarding the U.S. decision not to seek ratification ofGP I.

Non-lethal weapon systems also require legal review. DOD Directive 3000.3, Subj: Policy for
Non-Lethal Weapons, para. E6b. Non-lethal weapons are defined as U[w]eapons that are explicitly
designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing
fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and to the
environment." [d., para. C. Non-lethal weapons are not intended to take the place ofconventional
Qethal) weapons and their availability does not limit a commander's inherent authority and
obligation to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate action in self-defense. [d.,
para. D4. See also paragraph 4.3.2.2 (p. 263).
2. HR, art. 22; if. Lieber Code, art. 30. HR, art. 22, which refers to weapons and methods of
warfare, is merely an affirmation that the means of warfare are restricted by rules of conventional
(treaty) and customary international law. Although immediately directed to the conduct ofland
warfare: the principle embodied in HR, art. 22 is applicable equally to the conduct of naval
warfare. Art. 22 is viewed by the United States as declarative of customary international law,
(General Counsel, Department ofDefense letter of22 Sept. 1972, reprinted in 67 Am. J. Int'l L. 122
(1973». HR, art. 22 is confirmed in GP I, art. 35(1). The United States supports art. 35(1) ofGP I as
a statement of customary law. The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of
Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International
Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U.]. Int'l L. &
Policy 424 (1987) (remarks of U.S. Department ofState Deputy Legal Adviser Matheson). See also
paragraph 8.1, notes 1 & 2 (p. 401).
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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methods of warfare that are designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
3
suffering is prohibited. A corollary concept is that weapons which by their
nature are incapable of being directed specifically against military objectives, and
therefore that put noncombatants at equivalent risk, are forbidden due to their
indiscriminate effect. 4 A few weapons, such as poisoned projectiles, are
unlawful, no matter how employed. 5 Others may be rendered unlawful by
alteration, such as by coating ammunition with a poison. Still others may be
unlawfully employed, such as by setting armed contact naval mines adrift so as to
endanger innocent as well as enemy shipping. And finally, any weapon may be
set to an unlawful purpose when it is directed against noncombatants and other
protected persons and property. (See Chapter 11-Noncombatant Persons.)
Of particular interest to naval officers are law of armed conflict rules
pertaining to naval mines, land mines, torpedoes, cluster and fragmentation
weapons, delayed action devices, incendiary weapons, directed energy devices
and over-the-horizon weapons systems. Each of these weapons or systems will
be assessed in terms of its potential for causing unnecessary suffering and
superfluous injury or indiscriminate effect. 6
9.1.1 Unnecessary Suffering. Antipers~nnel weapons are designed to kill or
disable enemy combatants and are lawful notwithstanding the death, pain, and
suffering they inflict. Weapons that are designed to cause unnecessary suffering
or superfluous injury are, however, prohibited because the degree of pain or
injury, or the certainty of death they produce is needlessly or clearly
disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained by their use. Poisoned
projectiles and small arms ammunition intended to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering fall into this category? Similarly, using materials that are
3. HR, art. 23(e), forbids belligerents "to employ anns, projectiles, or material calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering." These rules are confirmed in GP I, art. 35(2), and are viewed by the
United States as declaratory of customary international law. General Counsel letter and Matheson
remarks, preceding note.
4. This customary rule is codified in GP I, arts. 51 (4) (b) and 51(5). See Green at 151-52; Fleck
at 111-14.
5. Lieber Code, arts, 16 & 70; Declaration of Brussels, art. 13(a); 1880 Oxford Manual, art.
8(a); 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War, art. 16(1). This customary rule was codified in HR, art.
23(a), to which the United States is a party. With regard to their use in reprisal, see paragraph 6.2.3.3,
note 52 (p. 341). See also Green, What One Can Do In Conflict - Then and Now, in International
Humanitarian Law: Challenges for the Next Ten Years 269-95 (Delissens & Tanja eds., 1991).
6. Non-lethal weapons are not addressed in this edition ofNWP 1-14M but will be included
in follow-on versions. Fora discussion ofnon-lethal weapons see Non-Lethal Weapons: Emerging
Requirements for Security Strategy, Report Prepared by The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
(1996). See also note 1 (p. 437).
7. The 1899 Hague Declaration IV Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Bullets which
Expand or Flatten Easily in the Human Body, The Hague, 29 July 1899, reprinted in
Schindler & Toman at 103 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Declaration], prohibits the use in international
(continued ...)
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7.(...continued)
anned conflict of "bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a
hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pieced with incisions." The United
States is not a party to this treaty, but has taken the position that the United States will adhere to its
tenns in conventional military operations to the extent that its application is consistent with the
object.and purpose of HR, art. 23(e) (which prohibits employment of "arms, projectiles, or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. ") See, ArmyJAG Memo DAJAIIO of16 Feb 93,
Legal Review of USSOCOM Special Operations Offensive Handgun (concluding use of
hollow-tip or similar expanding ammunition by special operations force personnel across the
spectrum ofconflict is lawful); Army JAG Memo DAJAIIA of12 Oct 90, Sniper Use of Open-Tip
Ammunition (concluding 7.62mm "open-tip" MatchKing Ammunition bullet may lawfully be
employed in peacetime or wartime missions ofthe Army), reprinted in The Army Lawyer, Feb 91, at
86; Army JAG Memo DAJA-IO (27-1a) of13 May 1996, Fabrique Nationale 5.7 x 28mm Weapon
System (concluding that the JAG Memo DAJA-IO (27-1a) of13 May 1996, Fabrique Nationale
5.7 x 28mm Weapon System (concluding that the Fabrique Nationale P90 and its 5.7 x 28mm SS190
projectile do not produce wounds that cause superfluous injury). In essense, the foregoingArmy JAG
opinions express the view that the rule against hollow-point or expanding bullets is not to be applied
mechanically; e.g., bullets designed with a hollow point for increased accuracy are not prohibited.
Legal analysis of small arms ammunition has also focused on increased accuracy and reduced
probability of over penetration which, aside from having obvious military advantages, also reduce
the likelihood of incidental injury to noncombatants. Finally, the Army JAG opinions conclude
that the prohibition contained in the 1899 Hague Declaration "is of minimal to no value,
inasmuch as virtually all full metaljacketed military rifle bullets employed since 1899 with pointed
ogival "spitzer" tip shape have a tendency to fragment on impact ... leading to wounds not
dissimilar to those condemned by the 1899 Hague Declaration .... The true test remains whether
or not a bullet causes superfluous injury... "
Use of expanding ammunition by units involved in full-time operations against terrorists is not
constrained by the law of armed conflict. Navy JAG ltr of22January 1992, Legal Review of the
Use of Expanding Ammunition by Marine Corps Units (concluding use of9mm hollow-point
ammunition in peacetime counterterrorist and special security missions is lawful); Army JAG
Memo DAJA-IA 198517026 of23 Sep 85, Use of Expanding Ammunition by U.S. Military
Forces in Counterterrorist Incidents (concluding such use is lawful); Air Force JAG Memo HQ
USAF/JAI of22 Aug 1997, Legal Review of Security Police Use of9mm Expanding, Hollow
Point Bullets (pHOENIX RAVEN Program) (concluding that such use constitutes a peacetime
law enforcement function and is not unlawful).
There is no rule of conventional or customary international law that would prohibit the use of
shotguns in armed conflict. DA Pam 27-161-2 at 45, Cutshaw, Ammunition, in 1 International
Military and Defense Encyclopedia (Dupuy ed., 1993) at 127 notes that:
Shotguns are especially useful injungle warfare, where ranges ofengagement seldom
exceed 50 meters (165 ft). Indeed, they were widely used by U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Contra see Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat in Fleck at 122 who agrues that:
It is prohibited to use bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body (e.g.,
dum-dum bullets) (Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets of 1899). This
applies also to the use ofshotguns, since shot causes similar suffering urUustified from
the military point of view....

But see Parks, Joint Service Combat Shotgun Program, in The Army Lawyer (DA Pam
27-50-299), Oct. 1997, who concludes, inter alia, that:
(continued...)
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difficult to detect or undetectable by field x-ray equipment, such as glass or clear
plastic, as the injuring mechanism in military ammunition is prohibited, since
they unnecessarily inhibit the treatment of wounds. 8 Use of such materials as
incidental components in ammunition, e.g., as wadding or packing, is not
prohibited. Use of .50 caliber weapons against individual enemy combatants
does not constitute a violation of this proscription against unnecessary suffering
..
9
or supe rf1uous lIl:JUry.
9.1.2 Indiscriminate Effect. Weapons that are incapable of being controlled
(i.e., directed at a military target) are forbidden as being indiscriminate in their
10
effect. Drifting armed contact mines and long-range unguided missiles (such as
the German V-l and V-2 rockets of World War II) fill into this category. A
weapon is not indiscriminate simply because it may cause incidental or collateral
civilian casualties, provided such casualties are not foreseeably excessive in light of
the expected military advantage to be gained. 11 An artillery round that is capable of
being directed with a reasonable degree of accuracy at a military target is not an
indiscriminate weapon simply because it may miss its mark or inflict collateral
damage. Conversely, uncontrolled balloon-borne bombs, such as those released

7.(... continued)
Lead-and-antimony buckshot does not "expand or flatten easily," and therefore
violates neither the 1899 Hague Delcaration nor the criteria for legality previously
articulated in opinions of the Judge Advocate General, United States Army.
The combat shotgun and its lead-and-antimony buckshot (or shot) ammunition are
consistent with the law of war obligations ofthe United States.
8. Protocol I (protocol on Non-Detectable Fragmerits) of the 1980 Conventional Weapons
Convention (see paragraph 5.4.2 and note 36 thereto (p. 304)) provides, in its entirety, that:
It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by
fragments which in the human body escape rletection by X-rays.

See also Lieber Code, art. 16; Fenrick, New Developments in the Law Concerning the Use of
Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict, 19 Can. Y.B. Int'lL. 229, 242 (1981); Roach, Certain
Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law? 105 Mil. L. Rev. 3,
69-72 (1984); and Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention: Implications for the
American Soldier, 24 A.F.L. Rev. 279, 308-12 (1984).
9. The persistent myth that .50 caliber weapons may not be lawfully employed against enemy
personnel is thought to have its origins in a Vietnam War era rule of engagment predicated upon
conserving .50 caliber ammunition. See, e.g., Smith, Rifle Expands Shooting Range of
Leathernecks, Jacksonville Daily News, Sept. 12, 1993 at p. Dl (perpetuating the erroneous
notion that .50 caliber ammuntion may not lawfully be directed against individual enemy soldiers).
10. GP I, art. 51(4)(b). See also Fleck at 118-20. Military targets are defined in paragraph 8.1.1
(p. 402). The rule stated in this sentence does not prohibit naval or land mines per se. Naval mines
and land mines are discussed in paragraphs 9.2 (p. 441) and 9.3 (p. 448), respectively.
11. See paragraph 8.1.2.1 (p. 404) for a discussion of this aspect of collateral damage. Compare
Lieber Code, art. 15.
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by the Japanese against the west coast of the United States and Canada in World
War II lack that capability of direction and are, therefore, unlawful. 12

9.2 NAVAL MINES
Naval mines have been effectively employed for area denial, coastal and
harbor defense, antisurface and antisubmarine warfare, and blockade. Naval
mines are lawful weapons, but their potential for indiscriminate effects has led to
specific regulation of their deployment and employment by the law of armed
conflict. 13 The extensive and uncontrolled use of naval mines by both sides in
the Russo-Japanese War of1904-5 inflicted great damage on innocent shipping
both during and long after that conflict, and led to Hague Convention No. VIII
of 1907 Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines. 14 The
purpose of the Hague rules is to ensure, to the extent practicable, the safety of
innocent shipping. These rules require that naval mines be so constructed as to
become harmless should they break loose from their moorings or otherwise
cease to be under the affirmative control of the belligerents that laid them. The
Hague rules also require that shipowners be warned of the presence of mines as
soon as military exigencies permit.
Although the Hague provisions date from 1907, they remain the only
codified rules specifically addressing the emplacement of conventional naval
mines. 15 Technological developments have created weapons systems obviously
not contemplated by the drafters of these rules. Nonetheless, the general
principles oflaw embodied in the 1907 Convention continue to serve as a guide
to lawful employment of naval mines. 16
12. Bothe, Partsch & So1£305; ICRC, Commentary (GP I) 621. The balloon-borne bombs are
described in Mikesh,Japan's World War II BalloonBornb Attacks on North America, Smithsonian
Annals ofFlight No.9 (1973); Webber, The Silent Siege: Japanese Attacks Against North America
in World War II (1984); Prioli, The Fu-Go Project, American Heritage, April-May 1982, at
89-92. The same assertion ofillegality might also be said ofan aborted American plan to drop bats
armed with tiny incendiary bombs onJapan. Feist, Bats Away, American Heritage, April-May
1982, at 93-94; Lewis, Bats Out of Hell, Soldier ofFortune, Nov. 1987, at 80-81, 112. The legality
of these weapons does not appear to have been previously addressed. See paragraph 9.1, note 1
(p.437).
13. See generally, Fleck 442-58; Green 168-69.
14. For a discussion of the background of Hague VIII see Fleck at 442.
15. 36 Stat. 2332; T.S. No. 541; 1 Bevans 669; DA Pam 27-161-2; Navy Supplement to
Selected International Agreements, AFP 110-20, p. 3-10. For an excellent analysis of the Hague
rules on mine warfare, see Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea 23-63 (1992). See also Clingan, Submarine
Mines in International Law, 351, in Robertson.
16. Nicaragua Military Adivities Case, 1986 I.CJ. 14, 111-12, 128-29, 147-48; 25 Int'l Leg.
Mat'Is 1023, 1072, 1080-81, 1090 (paras. 213-15, 253-54, 292(7) (14-1» (1986). See also dissenting
opinion ofJudge Schwebel, paras. 234-40, 25 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1205-07 (1986), and NWP 27-4
(Rev. B), Mining Operations, at 1-3 to 1-6.
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9.2.1 Current Technology. Modem naval mines are versatile and variable
weapons. They range from relatively unsophisticated and indiscriminate contact
mines to highly technical, target-selective devices with state-of-the-art homing
guidance capability, Today's mines may be armed and/or detonated by physical
contact, acoustic or magnetic signature, or sensitivity to changes in water
pressure generated by ~assing vessels and may be emplaced by air, surface, or
1
subsurface platforms.
For purposes of this publication, naval mines are
classified as armed or controlled mines. Armed mines are either emplaced with all
safety devices withdrawn, or are armed following emplacement, so as to detonate
when pre-set parameters (if any) are satisfied. Controlled mines have no
destructive capability until affirmatively activated by some form ofarming order
(whereupon they become armed mines).18
9.2.2 Peacetime Mining. Consistent with the safety of its own citizenry, a
nation may emplace both armed and controlled mines in its own internal waters
at any time with or without notification. A nation may also mine its own
archipelagic waters and territorial sea during peacetime when deemed necessary
for national security purposes. If armed mines are emplaced in archipelagic
waters or the territorial sea, appropriate international notification of the
existence and location ofsuch mines is required. 19 Because the right ofinnocent
passage can be suspended only temporarily,z° armed mines must be removed or
rendered harmless as soon as the security threat that prompted their
emplacement has terminated. Armed mines may not be emplaced in
21
international straits or archipelagic sea lanes during peacetime. Emplacement
of controlled mines in a nation's own archipelagic waters or territorial sea is not
. or removareqUIrements.
l'
22
· to suc h not!'fication
sub~ect
Naval mines may not be emplaced in internal waters, territorial seas, or
archipelagic waters of another nation in peacetime without that nation's
17. Hartmann, Weapons That Wait 103-05 (1991); Levie, note 15, at 97-133.
18. Joint Pub. 1-02, at 35 & 89; Hartmann, note 17, at8 & 9. NWP 27-4 (Rev. B), note 16, at
1-3 to 1-8.
19. Corfu Channel Case (merits), 1949 I.C]. 22, U.S. Naval War College, International Law
Documents 1948-49, at 133 (based on "general and well-recognized principles, namely:
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of
freedom of maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States").
20. Suspension of innocent passage is discussed in paragraph 2.3.2.3 (po 119).
21. Commenting on the Corfu Channel Case, Fitzmaurice states that the I.C]. decision
authorizes the sweeping of mines unlawfully laid in an international strait if it is accomplished as
"part ofand incidental to the passage." Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedures on the International
Court ofJustice: General Principles and Substantive Law, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'lL. (1950) 1,30-31.
22. Controlled mines pose no hazard to navigation until they are armed. Neutral territorial seas
are discussed in paragraph 7.3.4 (po 375).
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consent. 23 Controlled mines may, however, be emplaced in international waters
(i.e., beyond the territorial sea) if they do not unreasonably interfere with other
lawful uses of the oceans. The determination of what constitutes an
"unreasonable interference" involves a balancing of a number of factors,
including the rationale for their emplacement (i.e., the self-defense requirements
of the emplacingnation), the extent of the area to be mined, the hazard (ifany) to
other lawful ocean uses, and the duration of their emplacement. Because
controlled mines do not constitute a hazard to navigation, international notice of
their emplacement is not required.
Armed mines may not be emplaced in international waters prior to the
outbreak of armed conflict, except under the most demanding requirements of
24
individual or collective self-defense. Should armed mines be emplaced in
international waters under such circumstances, prior notification of their location
must be provided. A nation emplacing armed mines in international waters during
peacetime must maintain an on-scene presence in the area sufficient to ensure that
appropriate warning is provided to ships approaching the danger area. All armed
mines must be expeditiously removed or rendered harmless when the imminent
danger that prompted their emplacement has passed.
9.2.3 Mining During Armed Conflict. Naval mines may be lawfully
employed by parties to an armed conflict subject to the following restrictions:
1. International notification of the location of emplaced mines must be made
·
..
. 25
as soon as military eXIgenCIes pe~t.
23. To do so would likely be regarded as a major violation of that nation's territorial integrity.
The national and international reactions to the covert mining of the Gulf ofSuez and the Red Sea
in mid-1984, allegedly by a Libyan merchant vessel, is examined in Truver, Mines ofAugust: An
International Whodunit, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1985, at 94; The GulfofSuez Mining Crisis:
Terrorism at Sea, id., Aug. 1985, at 10-11.
24. Thorpe, Mine Warfare at Sea-Some Legal Aspects of the Future, 18 Ocean Dev. & Int'l
L. 255, 267 (1987). See also Clingan, paragraph 9.2, note 15 (p. 441). Self-defense is discussed in
paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259).
25. Hague VIII, art. 3; Coifu Channel Case, 1949 I.CJ. 22. Such notice was not given in the
covert mining of the Red Sea in 1984, or in the Persian Gulfand the Gulf of Oman in 1987. In the
Nicaragua Military Adivities Case, 1986 I.CJ. 46-48, 112, 147-48, 25 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1039-40,
1072, 1090 (paras. 76-80, 215, 292(8)) (1986), the Court decided (14-1) that the United States, "by
failing to make known the existence and location of the mines laid by it [in 1984] ... has acted in
breach of its obligations under customary international law. " Judge Schwebel dissented with the
view that the mining ofNicaraguan ports was lawful in respect to Nicaragua, but unlawful in regard
to third nations because ofthe fuilure to give official public notice "about the fact that mines would
be or had been laid in specified waters." 19861.CJ. 378-80, 25 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1205-06 (paras.
234-240).Judge Jennings, while dissenting on other grounds, joined in subparagraph 292(8) ofthe
Court's opinion by applying the logic of the Corfu Channel judgment, in which two British
destroyers hit moored contact mines laid in Albanian waters, that the obligation to notifY the
existence of mines "for the benefit of shipping in general" is an obligation
(continued ...)
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2. Mines may not be emplaced by belligerents in neutral waters. 26
3. Anchored mines must become harmless as soon as they have broken their
.
27
moonngs.
4. Unanchored mines not otherwise affixed or imbedded in the bottom must
become harmless within an hour after loss of control over them. 28
5. The location of minefields must be carefully recorded to ensure accurate
notification and facilitate subsequent removal and/or deactivation. 29
25.(... continued)
[B]ased, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time of
war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of
freedom ofmaritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States (1949 I.CJ. 22).
judge jennings applied this law a fortiori to the situation where a nation lays mines in another
nation's ports or port approaches and fails to notify shipping. judge jennings noted that "even
supposing the United States were acting in legitimate self-defence, failure to notify shipping would
still make the mine-laying unlawful." 1986 I.C.]. 536, 25 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1284 (1986).
The San Remo Manual, para. 83, provides that:
The laying of armed mines or the arming of pre-laid mines must be notified unless
the mines can only be detonated against vessels which are military objectives.
The commentary on para. 83 in Doswald-Beck, at 172, indicates that the decision to omit the
qualifying phrase "as soon as military exigencies permit" ofHague VIII, art. 3, was premised on the
notion that it was "not justified in the light of the general requirement imposed upon belligerents
to limit as much as possible the effect of hostilities." Notwithstanding the San Remo Manual's
modern origins, it is considered that the Hague VIII, art. 3 approach continues to represent the
more realistic possibility and probability of compliance. Hence adherence to the term "as soon as
military exigencies permit" in paragraph 9.2.3, subparagraph l.
26. Hague XIII, arts. 1-2. This rule was not always observed by the belligerents in the Iran-Iraq
war. Ships hit mines in the national waters of Kuwait and Oman, both of whom claimed neutral
status. N.Y. Times,20july 1987,atA6, & 14 Aug. 1987,atA9. See also San Remo Manual, para. 86.
27. Hague VIII, art. 1(2); Hartmann, paragraph 9.2.1, note 17 (p. 442), at8 &84. CompareSan
Remo Manual, para. 81. U.S. naval mines are all constructed with self-neutralizing devices. For
example, the mines laid in Haiphong Harbor in 1972 were set to neutralize within six months.
They exploded, thereby giving visible reminders ofthe existence of the minefield and the need for
reseeding of the minefield. On the other hand, the anchored contact mines laid by Iran in the
Tanker War (1984-88) frequendy broke loose but lacking the requisite built-in mechanism to
render them harmless, continued to pose a hazard to shipping.
28. See Hague VIII, art. 1 (1). Hague VIII does not include the phrase "not othenvise affixed or
imbedded in the bottom" in its art. 1(1) prescription that "unanchored automatic contact mines"
must become harmless within an hour after control over them is lost. However, mines so "affixed
or imbedded in the bottom" do not constitute a hazard to general navigation in the sense that
free-floating mines do. The San Remo Manual, para. 82, employs the term "free-floating" rather
than "unanchored" in this context to the same result. See Doswald-Beck, at 17l.
29. See Hague VIII, art. 5; San Remo Manual, paras. 84 & 90. At the close of hostilities, each
nation should remove the mines it has laid. However, each nation must remove the mines in its
own waters, irrespective of the entity which laid them. The nations party to the conflict may also
make other arrangements for mine clearance.
(continued ... )
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29.(... continued)
The Annistice of1918 called upon Gennany to indicate the location ofnaval mines. Art. XXIV of
the Gennan Annistice of11 Nov. 1918, U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents,
1918, at 65 ("the Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all
minefields and to destroy obstructions laid by Gennany outside Gennan territorial waters, the
positions of which are to be indicated,"); art. IV, sec. 2, of the Austro-Hungarian Annistice of3
Nov. 1918, id., at 19; art. IV, sec. 2, of the appendix to the Austro-Hungarian Annistice, id.,
at 27-28. Art. XIII of the Hungarian Annistice of13 Nov. 1918, id., at 33 (mines in the Danube);
arts. II and III of Turkish Annistice of30 Oct. 1918, id., at 160. The burden of removal was,
however, only pressed upon those nations according to the geographical relationship or proximity
oftheir respective territories to mines or fields ofmines which they had sown. Thus, Turkey was to
assist in sweeping or to remove, as might be required, all mines and other obstructions in Turkish
waters. !d. at 160. Hungary undertook to stop the passage of floating mines sown in the Danube
upstream from the Hungarian and Austrian frontier and to remove all those actually in Hungarian
waters. [d., at 33. According to art. 193 of the Gennan peace treaty of Versailles of28June 1919,
Gennany undertook to sweep the mines in specified areas in the easterly portion ofthe North Sea,
to keep those areas free from mines, and to sweep and keep free from mines such areas in the Baltic
as might ultimately be notified by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. 3 U.S.T. 3410. U.S.
naval forces undertook successfully the removal ofmines which they had laid in the North Sea. For
an illuminating account of the accomplishment of this task, see Davis, The Removal of the North
Sea Mine Barrage, 38 National Geographic, Feb. 1920, at 103.
According to the armistice treaties between France and Gennany, of22June 1940, (art. IX, 34
Am.J. Int'l L., Official Documents, at 173, 175) and France and Italy, of24June 1940, (arts. XII
and XIII, id., at 178, 181) the French Government undertook not only to report to the enemy the
location of mines which it had set out, but also, if so required by the enemy, to clear away such
mines. 3 Hyde 1946-47.
After World War II, some of the Allies (United States, France, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R.)
agreed on an International Organization for the Clearance of Mines in European Waters.
Agreement on Mine Clearance in European Waters, London, 22 Nov. 1945,3 Bevans 1322.
Other stipulations regarding assistance in mine clearance at the close ofWorld War II may be found
in the Instrument ofSurrender ofItaly, 29 Sep. 1943, 61 Stat. 2742, 2743-44, T.I.A.S. 1604; the
Treaty ofPeacewith Italy, Paris, 10 Feb. 1947,61 Stat. 1245, 1396, T.I.A.S. 1648,49 U.N.T.S. 3,
153, and the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Gennany and the Assumption of Supreme
Authority by the Allied Powers of5 June 1945, 60 Stat. 1648, 1654, T.I.A.S. 1520, 68 U.N.T.S.
189, 198. On mine clearance in Gennan waters and the North Sea, see 3 Roskill, The War at Sea,
pt. II, at 307 & 308 (1961). On mine clearance in the Pacific, see Morison, Supplement and General
Index, 15 History of United States Naval Operations In World War II, at 13-14 (1962).
The Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet Nam Conceniing
the Removal, Pennanent Deactivation, or Destruction ofMines in the Territorial Waters, Ports,
Harbors, and Waterways of the Democratic Republic ofViet Nam, 27 Jan. 1973,24 U.S.T. 133,
T.I.A.S. 7542, required the United States to clear all mines it had so placed by rendeting them
harmless through removal, pennanent deactivation, or destruction. This mine clearance operation
is described in McCauley, Operation End Sweep, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., March 1974, at 18.
The United States and Egypt, through an exchange ofnotes dated 13 and 25 April 1974, agreed on
an arrangement for U.S. assistance in clearing mines and unexploded ordnance from the Suez
Canal, 25 U.S.T. 1474, T.I.A.S. 7882. This agreement was amended by an exchange of notes
dated6July, 20 and 21 August, and 25 September1975, 26 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. 8169. The Suez
Canal clearance operation is described in Boyd, Nimrod Spar: Clearing the Suez Canal, U.S. Naval
Inst. Prec., Feb 1976, at 18.
(continued...)
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6. Naval mines may be employed to channelize neutral shipping, but not in a
manner to deny transit passage of international straits30 or archipelagic sea lanes
passage of archipelagic waters by such shipping. 31
7. Naval mines may not be emplaced off the coasts and ports of the enemy
with the sole objective of intercepting commercial shipping,32 but may
otherwise be employed in the strategic blockade of enemy ports, coasts, and
waterways.33
29.(... continued)
On the other hand, as a matter ofself-defense, the United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, France,
Italy and the Netherlands conducted extended mine countermeasures in international and neutral
waters of the Persian Gulf(the latter with the neutral nations' consent) from July 1987 in order to
remove the interference with freedom ofnavigation caused by the contact mines unlawfully laid by
Iran. See notes 26 and 27 (p. 444); Friedman, World Naval Developments 1987, U.S. Naval Inst.
Proc., May 1988, at 219-20; and Friedman, Western European and NATO Navies, U.S. Naval Inst.
Proc., March 1988, at 34 & 39. Following the cessation of hostilities in the 1991 Persian GulfWar,
the U.N. Security Council demanded that "Iraq provide all information and assistance in identifYing
Iraqi mines ... in Kuwait, in areas ofIraq ... and in the adjacent waters." U.N.S.C.R. 686 (2 March
1991) S/RES/686 (1991) reported in 30 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 568,569 (1991).
30. See note 25 (p. 443). Transit passage is discussed in paragraph 2.3.3 (p. 121).
31. Archipelagic sea lanes passage is discussed in paragraph 2.3.4.1 (p. 127).
32. Hague VIII, art. 2. See also Ronzitti, at 143; Levie, paragraph 9.2, note 15 (p. 441), at 32-3.
France and Gertnany filed reservations on this article upon ratification.
33. 1909 Declaration of London Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, London, 26
February 1909, reprinted in Schindler & Toman at 755 [hereinafter Declaration of London] , arts. 1,
4 & 5. See paragraph 7.7 (p. 390) for a detailed discussion of blockade.
At one time, a blockade established exclusively by minefields was considered illegal because
international law required that naval forces be present for the maintenance of an effective
blockade. It has also been claimed that a blockade established by mines alone violates art. 2 of
Hague VIII which prohibits the use of mines with the sole object of intercepting commercial
shipping, although historically the primary purpose of a blockade has been just that.
The international acceptance ofthe U.S. mine blockade of Haiphong Harbor during the Viemam
conflict has established a legal precedent for blockades enforced by mines alone. (But see Levie,
paragraph 9.2, note 15 (p. 441) at 144-47, 156-57.) In that instance, it was argued effectively that
all significant requirements of blockade were established:
- First, by virtue ofits status as a belligerent in the Vietnam conflict, the United States was
empowered to employ blockade as a mode of coercion.
- The blockade was established pursuant to the authorization of the President of the
United States, an appropriate authority from the perspective of customary international law and
the only legal authority in terms of U.S. practice.
- Notice to all governments and shipping interests was assured by the President's public
announcement via a letter from the U.S. representative to the President of the U.N. Security
Council, notices to mariners, and by the U.S.-South Vietnamese undertaking to warn all vessels
approaching the mined areas.
- An interval of three daylight periods was allowed as a grace period during which all
vessels in North Vietnamese waters might exit without danger.
(continued...)
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8. Mining of areas of indefinite extent in international waters is prohibited.
Reasonably limited barred areas may be established by naval mines, provided
neutral shipping retains an alternate route around or through such an area with
reasonable assurance of safety.34
33.(...continued)
- The blockade was stricdy limited to Vietnamese-claimed territorial seas, did not extend
to preclude access to neutral ports or coasts, and did not interfere in any way with neutral shipping
on the high seas.
- Impartial application of that blockade to all States was inherent in the very nature of the
operation, because mines are passive instrumentalities generally incapable of discerning the
nationality of the targeted platform.
- The blockade did not result in starvation of the civilian population or denial of essential
foodstuffi, clothing and tonics (intended for children under 15, expectant mothers and maternity
cases) or medical and hospitalstores since there were overland, air and domestic sources ofsupply.
- And, finally, the blockade was effective, operating to close the ports of North Vietnam
and contributing to a reduction in the flow of war materials from North Vietnam to South
Vietnam to approximately 10 percent of its prior level.
The operation was therefore conducted in a manner compatible with traditional requirements of
blockade and was permissible when judged by those criteria. Swayze, Traditional Principles of
Blockade in Recent Practice: United States Mining ofIntemal and Territorial Waters of North
Vietnam, 29 JAG]. 163 (1977). Compare Levie, paragraph 9.2, note 15 (p. 441) at 144-47,153-55
who correcdy notes that at the time of the mining of North Vietnamese ports in 1972, U.S.
spokesmen carefully refrained from characterizing that operation as a "blockade." The 1986 I. CJ.
opinion on the merits of the Nicaragua Miliary Activities Case did not address the legality of the
use of mines as the instrumentality for enforcement of a blockade.
It appears that classic arguments to the effect that only naval forces can satisfy the legal requirements
of blockade can be successfully refuted by recitation of the myriad resources now available to the
modem naval commander. Current warfare techniques which involve the use of radar, sonar,
aircraft, and satellite information gathering appear clearly to provide for an effective blockade
capability without the need to keep naval forces in the vicinity for the purpose of intercepting
would-be blockade runners. Moreover, modem weapons systems now generally available to
blockaded nations, including high performance aircraft, over-the-horizon missiles, and
long-range artillery, render on-scene surface enforcement difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.
The San Remo Manual does not include a requirement for an on-scene surface'warship in a lawful
blockade. Para. 97 provides that:
A blockade may be enforced and maintained by a combination 9flegitimate methods
and means of warfare ....
The commentary on this provision in Doswald-Beck, at 178, states:
This paragraph [97] does not require the enforcement ofa blockade by surface ships
only. It does, however, prohibit the enforcement solely, by weapons systems, such as
mines, unless they are employed in such a manner as not to endanger legitimate
sea-going commerce.
34. The San Remo Manual, para. 80, provides:
(continued, ..)
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9.3 LAND MINES
Land mines are munitions placed on, under, or near the ground or other
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the passage of time; the
presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle; or upon command. As
with all weapons, to be lawful, land mines must be directed at military objectives.
The controlled nature of command detonated land mines provides effective
target discrimination. In the case of non-command detonated land mines,
however, there exists potential for indiscriminate injury to noncombatants. 35
Accordingly, special care must be taken when em~loying land mines to ensure
noncombatants are not indiscriminately injured. 6 Intemationallaw requires
34.{... continued)
Mines may only be used for legitimate military purposes including the denial ofsea
areas to the enemy.
The commentary on that para. in Doswald-Beck (at 169) states:
The obligation to use mines for legitimate military purposes logically flows from
rules of international humanitarian law. Participants [in the San Remo Manual
drafring process] deemed reaffirmation ofthe rule in specific relation to naval mining
to be useful in order to establish unequivocally that indiscriminate mining practices
on the high seas are unlawful.

See also Thorpe, paragraph 9.2.3, note 24 (po 443), at 265. In the Persian Gulfwar on 21 September
1987, the Iranian naval vessel IRAN AJR was captured by U.S. forces in the act oflaying mines in
the international shipping lanes without notice. Presidential letter of24 Sep. 1987, 23 Weekly
Compo Pres. Docs. 1066 (1987); Elliott, The Navy in 1987, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1988,
at 146-47. See also the U.S. response to Iranian mining that severely damaged USS SAMUEL B.
ROBERTS on 14 April 1988 discussed at paragraph 8.5.2, note 126 (po 427):
35. See Anns Project of Human Rights Watch/Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A
Deadly Legacy (1993).
36. The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention {see paragraph 5.4.2 and note 36 thereto
(pp. 299 & 304) is an umbrella treaty which originally had three supporting
protocols - nondetectable fragments (Protocol I), mines and booby-traps (protocol II), and
incendiary weapons (Protocol III). The United States became a party to the Convention, and to
Protocols I and II, on 24 September 1995. Protocol II, entitled Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use ofMines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, is the first treaty to specifically
address the employment ofland mines.
The law of land mine warfare and the implications of Protocol II are discussed in Fenrick,
paragraph 9.1.1, note 8 (po 440), at 242-45; Schmidt, id., at 312-22, 329-38; Carnahan, The Law of
Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, 105 Mil. L. Rev. 73 (1984); Greenspan, The Modem Law of Land Warfare, 362-63
(1959); Rogers, A Commentary on the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 26 Mil. L. & L. of War Rev. 185 (1987); Green at
132-34, 186 and 337; and Levie, Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conventional
Weapons, 68 St. Johns L. Rev. 643 (1994), reprinted in Schmitt & Green at chap. XVIII.
The Law ofland mine warfare is undergoing substantial evolutionary change. At the First Review
Conference on the Conventional Weapons Convention (September 1995-May 1996), Protocol II
(continued ...)
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36.(...continued)
was substantially amended to restrict the use and transfer of mines lacking
self-destruction/self-deactivation capability. (protocol II, as amended, is reprinted in 35 Int'l Leg.
Mat'Is 1206 (1996».
On 7 January 1997, President Clinton transmitted Protocol II (as amended) to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification. Letter ofTransmittal, 7 Jan. 1997, see Annex A9-1 (p. 455). The
amended Protocol accomplishes six principal purposes:
a. It expands the application of Protocol II to internal armed conflicts (art. 1(2»;
b. It requires that all remotely delivered anti-personnel land mines be, equipped with
self-destruction devices and backup self-deactivation devices (art. 6(3»;
c. It mandates that all nonremotely delivered anti-personnel land mines not so
equipped be used only within controlled and marked perimeters (art. 5(2}(a»;
d. It requires all anti-personnel land mines to contain the equivalent of8 grams of
iron to ensure detectability (art. 4; Technical Annex, para. 2);
e. It imposes upon the party laying the mines responsibility to ensure against their
irresponsible and indiscriminate use (art. 14) and to clear, remove or destroy them
without delay upon the cessation of active hostilities, or to maintain them within a
marked and monitored area (art. 10); and

£ It provides means for more effective compliance (art. 14).
See also the article-by-article analysis of Protocol II, as amended, in the State Department Letter of
Submittal of 7 December 1996 attadled to Senate Treaty Doc. 105-1; Matheson, Current
Developments, The Revision of the Mines Protocol, 91 Am.]. Int'l L. 158 (1997).
Claymore mines employed in a command-detonated mode do not fall within the proscriptions of
Protocol II, as amended. Letter of Submittal, id., at 7. Claymore mines may be employed in a
trip-wired mode provided they are located in the immediate vicinity of the military unit that
emplaced them and that the area oftheir emplacement is monitored to ensure effective exclusion of
civilians. Id., at 23.
The 7 January 1997 Letter of Transmittal also renewed President Clinton's commitment to seek
international acceptance ofa total prohibition ofanti-personnel land mines. President Clinton had
first announced his commitment to that end on 16 May 1996. (That announcement also
established a unilatetal commitment to immediately suspend use of all non-self-destructing
anti-personnel land mines and to destroy existing stocks of such weapons by 1 January 2000.
Anti-personnel land mines currendy in place in Korea were excepted from this policy
pronouncement.) White House Press Release, May 16, 1.996. This was followed by a resolution in
the U.N. General Assembly on 10 December 1996 urging all nations to pursue a total ban on all
anti-personnel land mines. U.N.G.A. Res. 51/45S (10 Dec. 1996).
On 17 January 1997, President Clinton announced that the United States had unilaterally
established a permanent ban on the "export and transfer of anti-personnel land mines. (White
House Press Release, Jan. 17, 1997).
On 20 January 1997, at the opening of the 1997 session of the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva, the United States "began to work with the other [61] member nations to initiate
negotiations on a comprehensive, global agreement to ban [anti-personnel land mines]." (White
House Press Release, May 19, 1997.) On 18 August 1997, President Clinton announced that the
United States would participate in the Canadian-led effort (the so-called "Ottawa process")
outside ofthe Conference on Disarmamentprocess to achieve a total ban on anti-personnelland
(continued...)
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that, to the extent possible, belligerents record the location of all minefields in
order to facilitate their removal upon the cessation of hostilities. 37 It is the
36.(... continued)
mines, but would propose provisions to preserve the right to continue their use in Korea and in
conjunction with the emplacement ofanti-tank/anti-vehicle mines. (White House Press Release,
Aug. 18, 1997; Graham, U.S. to Join Canadian-Led Talks on Land Mine Ban, With Reservations,
Wash. Post, 19 Aug. 1997 at 1/4.) U.S. efforts to amend the draft "Ottawa process" treaty were
unsuccessful. Bonner, Land Mine Treaty Takes Final Form Over U.S. Dissent, N.Y. Times, 18
Sep. 1997 at 1. Accordingly, President Clinton announced on 17 September 1997 that the U.S.
would not sign the total ban treaty. Wilson, Clinton Declines to Sign Treaty to Ban
Anti-Personnel Land Mines, Army Times, 6 Oct. 1997 at 32.
The Senior Military Leadership of the United States has cautioned that unilateral U.S. adherence
to a total abolition of all anti-personnel land mines "will unnecessarily endanger U.S. military
forces and significantly restrict the ability to conduct combat operations successfully." Letrer to the
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, from the Joint ChiefS/Unified Combatant
Commanders, of 14 July 1997. That letter, written in response to proposed legislation which
would permanently restrict the use of funds for new deployment of anti-personnel land mines
commencing in the year 2000, included the following observations:
We share the world's concern about the growing humanitarian problem related to
the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of a lawful weapon, non-self-destructing
APL [anti-personnel land mines]. In fact, we have banned non self-destructing
("dumb") APL, except for Korea. We support the President's APL policy which has
started us on the road to ending our reliance on any anti-personnel land mines.
Having taken a great step toward the elimination of APL, we must, at this time,
retain the use ofself-destructing APL in order to minimize the risk to US soldiers and
marines in combat. However, we are ready to ban all APL when the major producers
and suppliers ban theirs or when an alternative is available.
Land mines are a "combat multiplier" for US land forces, especially since the
dramatic reduction of the force structure. Self-destructing land mines greatly
enhance the ability to shape the battlefield, protect unit flanks, and maximize the
effects of other weapons systems. Self-destructing land, mines are particularly
important to the protection ofearly entry and light forces, which must be prepared to
fight outnumbered during the initial stages of a deployment.

We request that you critically review the new APL legislation and take appropriate
action to ensure maximum protection for our soldiers and marines who carry out
national security policy at grave personal risk. Until the United States has a capable
replacement for self-destructing APL, maximum flexibility and warfighting
capability for American combat commanders must be preserved. The lives of our
sons and daughters should be given the highest priority when deciding whether or
not to ban unilaterally the use of self-destructing APL.
37. Art. 7 and the Technical Annex of the original text of Protocol II of the Conventional
Weapons Convention required nations that are parties thereto to record the location of all
pre-planned minefields and to endeavor to ensure the recording of the location of all other
minefields. This is the practice of many States; however, it is uncertain whether this burden will
prove too onerous to be practicable for some States. See Levie, The Code ofInternational Armed
Conflict, 146-47 (1986) in which he notes that it remains to be seen whether States will be able to
comply with the Convention's detailed recording requirements. Art. 9 and the Technical Annex
of Protocol II, as amended, continues this obligation to record the location of emplaced mines.
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practice of the United States to record the location of minefields in all
circumstances.

9.4 TORPEDOES
Torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark
constitute a danger to innocent shipping and are therefore unlawful. 38 All U.S.
Navy torpedoes are designed to sink to the bottom and become harmless upon
· 0 fth elr
. prop uls·IOn run. 39
compIetlon

9.5 CLUSTER AND FRAGMENTATION WEAPONS
Cluster and fragmentation weapons are projectiles, bombs, missiles,
submunitions, and grenades that are designed to fragment upon detonation,
thereby expanding the radius of their lethality and destructiveness. These
weapons are lawful when used against combatants. When used in proximity to
noncombatants or civilian objects, their employment should be carefully
monitored to ensure that collateral damage and incidental injury is not excessive
in relation to the legitimate military advantage sought. 40

9.6 BOOBY TRAPS AND OTHER DELAYED ACTION
DEVICES
Booby traps and other delayed action devices are not unlawful, provided they
are not designed to cause unnecessary suffering or employed in an indiscriminate
manner. 41 Devices that are designed to simulate items likely to attract and injure
noncombatants (e.g., toys and trinkets) are prohibited. 42 Attaching booby traps to
protected persons or objects, such as the wounded and sick, dead bodies, or
medical facilities and supplies, is similarly prohibited. 43 Belligerents are required
38. Hague VIII, art. 1 (3). See also Fleck, -at 458. The San Remo Manual, para. 79, provides:
It is prohibited to use toxpedoes which do not sink or o~erwise become hannless
when they have completed their run.
39. Submarine Toxpedo Defense Manual (U), NWP 72-1 (Rev. A), vol. I, Mark 48 Toxpedo,
at 2-9 (1987).
40. Compare paragraph 8.1.2.1 (p. 404). Attempts to restrict further their use have failed. See
Schmidt, paragraph 9.1.1, note 8 (p. 440), at 294 & n. 96.
41. Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Conventions (see paragraph 9.3, note 36
(p. 448», as its tide (protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofMines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices) states, also regulates booby-traps and other delayed actions devices. However,
such devices are not prohibited when directed against enemy military personnel.
42. !d. Art. 6 ofthe original text ofProtocol II (art. 7 ofthe amended text) specifically prohibits
the use of such devices.
43. Fenrick, paragraph 9.1.1, note 8 (p. 440), at 245; Carnahan, paragraph 9.3, note 36
(p. 448), at 89-93; Schmidt, paragraph 9.1.1, note 8 (p. 440), at 323-29; Rogers, paragraph 9.3,
note 36 (p. 448), at 198-200; and Green 132-33.
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to record the location of booby traps and other delayed action devices in the
same manner as land mines (see paragraph 9.3).

9.7 INCENDIARY WEAPONS
Incendiary devices, such as tracer ammumtlOn, therrnite bombs, flame
throwers, napalm, and other incendiary weapons and agents, are lawful weapons.
Where incendiary devices are the weapons of choice, they should be employed
in a manner that does not cause incidental injury or collateral damage that is
excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack. 44

9.8 DIRECTED ENERGY DEVICES
Directed energy devices, which include laser, high-powered microwave, and
particle beam devices, are not proscribed by the law ofarmed conflict. Lasers may
44. The Conventional Weapons Convention Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use ofIncendiary Weapons (Protocol Ill), reprinted in 19 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1534 (1980), AFP
110-20, at 3-182 [hereinafter Protocol Ill] applies to incendiary weapons the general principle,
reaffirmed in GP I, that civilians should not be subject to attack. It places severe restrictions on
attacks on military objectives located within a concentration of civilians and particularly by
prohibiting completely any attacks by aerially delivered "fire bombs," such as the thermite
bombs used in World War II, and napalm on such objectives. Green, 133-34; Parks, The
Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, 279 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 535 (1990); Levie, paragraph 9.3,
note 36 (p. 448).
Protocol III extends the traditional rule ofproportionality to prohibit the use ofground-to-ground
incendiaries against any military objective unless it is clearly separated from a concentration of
civilians and all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military objective
and to minimize collateral damage. It also specifically prohibits incendiary attacks on forests or
other plant cover except when those conceal, cover or camouflage combatants or other military
objectives, or are themselves military objectives.
Incendiary weapons, as defined in art. 1 of Protocol III, do not include munitions which have
incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, signalling flares, etc., or munitions
designed to combine an incendiary effect with penetration, blast or fragmenting effects, such as
armor-piercing rounds, etc., which are designed for use against tanks, aircraft, etc., and are not
intended to cause bum injuries to personnel.
The United States did not ratify Protocol III in 1995 when it became party to the Conventional
Weapons Convention and Protocols I and II. See paragraph 5.4.2 and note 36 thereto (pp. 299 &
304)). However, President Clinton included a request for advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification of Protocol III (subject to a reservation) in his Transmittal Letter of 7 January 1997.
Paragraph 9.3, note 36 (p. 448) and Annex A9-1 (p. 455). The proposed reservation would allow
employment of incendiary weapons, whether air-to-ground or ground-to-ground, against military
objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer
casualties and less collateral damage than alternate weapons. (For example, incendiary weapons are the
only means which can effectively destroy "biological weapons facilities which require high heat to
eliminate bio-toxins." Resort to high explosive munitions against such targets "would risk \videspread
release of dangerous contaminants with potentially disasterous consequences for the civilian
population." State Department Letter of Submittal (see paragraph 9.3, note 36 (p. 448)) at 39.
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be employed as a rangefinder or for target acquisition, with the possibility of
ancillary injury to enemy personnel, or direcdy against combatants as an
antipersonnel weapon. 45 Their use does not violate the prohibition against the
<r.
46
1·nfli·
ctlon 0 f unnecessary suuenng.
45. This statement is no longer completely accurate with respect to antipersonnel weapons.
There have been various efforts over the years to prohibit the use of lasers as antipersonnel
weapons, e.g., at the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva which produced GP I and II,
the 1978-1980 United Nations Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons, also in Geneva,
and by Sweden and Switzerland at the 1986 International Conference of the Red Cross. See
Robertson, paragraph 9.1, note 1 (p. 437), at 374-77. These efforts culminated in developments at
the First Review Conference on the Conventional Weapons Convention (September 1995-May
1996) which, in addition to adopting substantial changes to Protocol II (Mines, Booby-Traps, etc.)
(see paragraph 9.3, note 36 (p. 448», also adopted a new protocol on lasers. Entitled Protocol on
Blinding Laser Weapons (protocol IV), reprinted in 35 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1218 (1996) [hereinafter
Protocol IV], Protocol IV prohibits the use or transfer of laser weapons specifically designed to
cause blindness to unenhanced vision (e.g., to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight
devices). While blinding as an incidental effect of "legitimate military employment" of range
finding or target acquisition lasers is not prohibited by Protocol IV (see art. 3), parties thereto are
obligated "to take all feasible precautions" to avoid such injuries. ld., art. 2.
President Clinton transmitted Protocol IV to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification as
part ofhis Transmittal Letter of7 January 1997. See paragraph 9.3, note 36 (p. 448) and Annex
A9-1 (p. 455). See also the article-by-article analysis of Protocol IV in the State Department Letter
of Submittal of7 December 1996 attadled to Senate Treaty Doc. 105-1. For a comprehensive
discussion of Protocol IV see ArmyJAG Memo, DAJA-IO (27-la) of20 December 1996, Trauaux
Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol, reprinted in The Army
Lawyer,Jun 1997, at 33. See also Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The Red Cross and Tactical
Laser Weapons, 18 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo LJ. 705 (1996); Carnahan & Robertson, Current
Development: The Protocol on "Blinding Laser Weapons": A New Direction for International
Humanitarian Law, 90 Am. J. InrI L. 484 (1996).
On 17January 1997, the Secretary ofDefense promulgated the following guidance on blinding lasers:
The Department ofDefense prohibits the use oflasers specifically designed to cause
permanent blindness and supports negotiations to prohibit the use ofsuch weapons.
However, laser systems are absolutely vital to our modem military. Among other
things, they are currently used for detection, targeting, range-finding,
communications and target destruction. They provide a critical technological edge
to US forces and allow, our forces to fight, win and survive on an increasingly lethal
battlefield. In addition, lasers provide significant humanitarian benefits. They allow'
weapon systems to be increasingly discriminate, thereby reducing collateral damage
to civilian lives and property. The Department ofDefense recognizes that accidental
or incidental eye injuries may occur on the battlefield as the result of the use oflasers
not specifically designed to cause permanent blindness. Therefore, we continue to
strive, through ttaining and doctrine, to minimize these injuries.
SECDEF Memo U00888/97, DOD Policy on Blinding Lasers, 17 Jan 1997.
46. In reviewing the legality oflasers as antipersonnel weapons, theJudge Advocate General of
the Army in 1988 noted that the most severe effects on personnel produced by lasers were
blindness, temporary and permanent, and severe skin burns. He observed that neither blindness
nor permanent disablement on the battlefield are unique to laser weapons and concluded that their
use "would not cause unnecessary suffering" when compared to other wounding mechanisms and
(continued...)
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9.9 OVER-THE-HORIZON WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Missiles and projectiles with over-the-horizon or beyond-visual-range
capabilities are lawful, provided they are equipped with sensors, or are employed
in conjunction with external sources of targeting data, that are sufficient to
ensure effective target discrimination. 47

46.{... continued)
therefore "the use ofantipersonnel laser weapons is lawful." Army JAG Memo on Use ofLasers as
Antipersonnel Weapons, 29 Sept. 1988, reprinted in The Army Lawyer, Nov. 1988 (DA PAM
27-50-191), at p. 3.
47. The legal standards for "effective target discrimination" are set forth in paragraph 9.1.2
(indiscriminate effect) (p. 440). Nations possessing OTHIBVR weapons are not required to use
them in lieu of unguided weapons. Parks, Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles and International
Law: A Response, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1977, at 122-23; O'Connell, The Legality of
Naval Cruise Missiles, 66 Am.]. Int'l L. 785, 793 (1972). Cj. Digby, Precision-Guided Weapons,
Adelphi Paper No. 118 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1975); Walker,
Precision-Guided Weapons, 245 Scientific American, Aug. 1981, at 37-45; 2 O'Connell 1131.
See also Robertson, paragraph 9.1, note 1 (p. 437), at pp. 371-72.
On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi Mirage F-l attacked USS STARK (FFG-31) in the Persian Gulf
northeast of Bahrain with two Exocet missiles without first identifYing the ship as a legitimate
target. Apparendy through navigational error, the Iraqi pilot thought USS STARK was located
within the Iranian-declared war zone of the Persian Gulf, a zone avoided by neutral and other
protected shipping. The Iraqi pilot followed standard Iraqi policy and fired at that target believed to
be within the Iranian war zone providing the largest radar return. House Armed Services Comm.
Report on the Staff Investigation into the Iraqi Attack on the USS Stark, 14 June 1907, at 8;
Vlahos, The Stark Report, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1988, at 64-67. Iraq accepted responsibility
for the erroneous attack. 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1427-1428 (1987). See also paragraph 6.2, note 21
(p.331).
The "Scud" missiles employed by Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War were the Iraqi "AI
Hussein" variant of the Soviet SS-l "Scud-B" SRBM (Short-Range Ballistic Missile). These
missiles, with a range of up to 6S0km and a SOOkg warhead, rely on a simple "strap down" inertial
guidance system. Lacking active radar terminal guidance, Scud-B has a CEP (Circular Error
Probable) ofapproximately 500 yds.Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, "Iraq: Offensive Weapons"
& "USSR: Offensive Weapons," (Lennox ed., 1990); The Illustrated Directory ofModern Soviet
Weapons, at 89, (Bonds ed., 1986). Unlike the German V-I and V-2 rockets of World War II,
which lacked on-board sensors and were employed without sufficient external sources of targeting
information to ensure a reasonable level of targeting discrimination, the Scud-B is fully capable of
being employed lawfully. However, Iraq's indiscriminate Scud-B missile attacks during the 1991
Persian Gulf War, which caused unnecessary destruction of Saudi Arabian and Israeli civilian
property, were war crimes in violation ofHR, art. 23(g). Tide V Report, 0-623.
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ANNEXA9-1

105TH CONGRESS
1st Session

}

SENATE

{

TREATYDOC
105-1

PROTOCOLS TO THE 1980
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

MESSAGE
FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
PROTOCOLS TO THE 1980 CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON
THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO
BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS: THE
AMENDED PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS AND OTHER DEVICES (pROTOCOL II OR THE AMENDED
MINES PROTOCOL); THE PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON
THE USE OF INCENDIARY WEAONS (pROTOCOL III OR THE INCENDIARY
WEAPONS PROTOCOL); AND THE PROTOCOL ON BLINDING LASER WEAPONS
(pROTOCOL IV)

JANUARY 7, 1997.-Protocols were read the first time and, together with the accompanying papers,
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use ofthe Senate
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE,January 7, 1997.
To the Senate

of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification,
the following Protocols to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: the amended Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices (Protocol II or the amended Mines Protocol); the Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary Weapons (Protocol III or
the Incendiary Weapons Protocol); and the Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV). Also transmitted for the information of the Senate is the
report of the Department of State with respect to these Protocols, together with
article-by-article analyses.
The most important of these Protocols is the amended Mines Protocol. It is an
essential step forward in dealing with the problem of anti-personnellandmines
(APL) and in minimizing the very severe casualties to civilians that have resulted
from their use. It is an important precursor to the total prohibition of these
weapons that the United States seeks.
Among other things, the amended Mines Protocol will do the
following: (1) expand the scope of the original Protocol to include internal
armed conflicts, where most civilian mine casualties have occurred; (2) require
that all remotely delivered anti-personnel mines be equipped with self-destruct
devices and backup self-deactivation features to ensure that they do not pose a
long-term threat to civilians; (3) require that all nonremotely delivered
anti-personnel mines that are not equipped with such devices be used only
within controlled, marked, and monitored minefields to protect the civilian
population in the area; (4) require that all anti-personnel mines be detectable
using commonly available technology to make the task of mine clearance easier
and safer; (5) require that the party laying mines assume responsibility for them
to ensure against their irresponsible and indiscriminate use; and (6) provide more
effective means for dealing with compliance problems to ensure that these
restrictions are actually observed. These objectives were all endorsed by the
Senate in its Resolution of Ratification of the Convention in March 1995.
The amended Mines Protocol was not as strong as we would have preferred.
In particular, its provisions on verification and compliance are not as rigorous as
we had proposed, and the transition periods allowed for the conversion or
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elimination of certain noncompliant mines are longer than we thought
necessary. We shall pursue these issues in the regular meetings that the amended
Protocol provides for review of its operation.
Nonetheless, I am convinced that this amended Protocol will, if generally
adhered to, save many lives and prevent many tragic injuries. It will, as well, help
to prepare the ground for the total prohibition of anti-personnellandmines to
which the United States is committed. In this regard, I cannot overemphasize
how seriously the United States takes the goal of eliminating APL entirely. The
carnage and devastation caused by anti-personnellandmines-the hidden killers
that murder and maim more than 25,000 people every year-must end.
On May 16, 1996, I launched an international effort to this end. This initiative
sets out a concrete path to a global ban on anti-personnellandmines and is one of
my top arms control priorities. At the same time, the policy recognizes that the
United States had international commitments and responsibilities that must be
taken into account in any negotiations on a total ban. As our work on this
initiative progresses, we will continue to consult with the Congress.
The second of these Protocols-the Protocol on Incendiary Weapons-is a
part of the original Convention but was not sent to the Senate for advice and
consent with the other 1980 Protocols in 1994 because of concerns about the
acceptability of the Protocol from a military point of view. Incendiary weapons
have significant potential military value, particularly with respect to flammable
military targets that cannot so readily be destroyed with conventional explosives.
At the same time, these weapons can be misused in a manner that could cause
heavy civilian casualties. In particular, the Protocol prohibits the use of
air-delivered incendiary weapons against targets located in a city, town, village,
or other concentration of civilians, a practice that caused very heavy civilian
casualties in past conflicts.
The executive branch has given very careful study to the Incendiaries
Protocol and has developed a reservation that would, in our view, make it
acceptable from a broader national security perspective. This proposed
reservation, the text of which appears in the report of the Department of State,
would reserve the right to use incendiaries against military objectives located in
concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer
casualties and less collateral damage than alternative weapons.
The third of these Protocols-the new Protocol on Blinding
Lasers-prohibits the use or transfer of laser weapons specifically designed to
cause pennanent blindness to unenhanced vision (that is, to the naked eye or to
the eye with corrective devices). The Protocol also requires Parties to take all
feasible precautions in the employment of other laser systems to avoid the
incidence of such blindness.
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These blinding lasers are not needed by our military forces. They are potential
weapons of the future, and the United States is committed to preventing their
emergence and use. The United States supports the adoption of this new
Protocol.
I recommend that the Senate give its early and favorable consideration to
these Protocols and give its advice and consent to ratification, subject to the
conditions described in the accompanying report of the Department of State.
The prompt ratification of the amended Mines Protocol is particularly
important, so that the United States can continue its position ofleadership in the
effort to deal with the humanitarian catastrophe ofirresponsible landmine use.

WILLIAM]. CLINTON.

